The Concrete Barrier at the End of the Information Superhighway: Why Lack of Local Rights-of-Way Access Is Killing Competitive Local Exchange Carriers by Day, Christopher R.
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 54 | Issue 3 Article 4
5-2002
The Concrete Barrier at the End of the Information
Superhighway: Why Lack of Local Rights-of-Way
Access Is Killing Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers
Christopher R. Day
Georgetown University Law Center
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications Law Commons, and the
Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Day, Christopher R. (2002) "The Concrete Barrier at the End of the Information Superhighway: Why Lack of Local Rights-of-Way
Access Is Killing Competitive Local Exchange Carriers," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 54: Iss. 3, Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol54/iss3/4
The Concrete Barrier at the End of the
Information Superhighway: Why Lack
of Local Rights-of-Way Access Is
Killing Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers
Christopher R. Day*
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 462
II. COMPETITIVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER MODELS ......... 463
A. Resale Carriers .................................................................. 463
B. Facilities-Based Carriers ................................................... 464
III. BARRIERS TO REASONABLE RIGHTS-OF-WAY ACCESS ............... 466
A. Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ............ 466
1. Plain Language ............................................................. 466
2. Legislative History ........................................................ 467
B. Municipal Regulation of Public Rights-of-Way ................... 469
1. Fees and In-Kind Compensation ................................... 470
2. Favorable Treatment of the Incumbent Provider ............ 471
3. "Third-Tier" Regulation of Service Offerings ................ 473
4. Municipal Delay as a Barrier to Entry ........................... 475
C. FCC Interpretation of Section 253 ...................................... 477
D. Judicial Interpretation of Section 253 ................................. 481
1. The Ninth Circuit Interpretation of Section 253 ............. 481
2. The Sixth Circuit Interpretation of Section 253 ............. 482
The Author is a Fellow at the Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown University
Law Center. The Author would like to thank Jeffrey M. Karp and L. Elise Dieterich of
Swidler, Berlin, Shereff, Friedman, LLP for their gracious assistance with this Article. The
views expressed in this Article are solely those of the Author.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
IV. STATE RESPONSES TO MUNICIPAL RIGHTS-OF-WAY ACCESS
ISSUES ....................................................................................... 484
A . D irect Fees ......................................................................... 484
B. In-Kind Compensation ........................................................ 485
C. Third-Tier Regulations ....................................................... 486
D. Prevention of Municipal Delay ........................................... 486
V . PROPOSALS ............................................................................... 487
A. Congress Should Amend Section 253 to Create a National
Rights-of-Way Access Standard .......................................... 487
B. The FCC Should Create a Rights-of-Way Access "Rocket
D ocket" ......................................... .................................... 490
V I. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 491
I. INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act)I contained the
promise of a deregulated national telecommunications market with
unfettered competition in both the local and long-distance
telecommunications markets. Unfortunately, five years after the 1996 Act
was signed into law, competition in local telephony is still not a reality in
many areas of the United States. While some of the blame for the failure of
local competition may be placed on failed business models and the
withdrawal of venture capital from the market,2 a series of regulatory
failures have also served to create an inhospitable environment for
competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs"). One of the areas where this
failure has been most evident is in Congress and the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC") failure to adequately address
municipal rights-of-way access for CLECs.3
This Article analyzes this regulatory failure, and presents a number of
legislative and regulatory suggestions that could lead to a more coherent
national scheme of regulation governing public rights-of-way access for
telecommunications carriers. The first Section of this Article provides an
1. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. See David A. Wolcott, An ALTS Analysis: Local Competition Policy & The New
Economy, Feb. 2, 2001, at 12 at http://www.alts.org/Filings/0202OIAnalysis.pdf (noting that
"the capital markets have been virtually shut down to the CLEC sector") [hereinafter ALTS
Analysis].
3. See Barnaby J. Feder, New Economy: Fiber, Fiber Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2001, at C4 (noting that while excess capacity exists on many long-haul fiber optic
routes "the crucial missing links are within the metropolitan networks that connect
businesses and homes to the high-speed long-distance fiber").
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overview of the two general business models that developed for CLECs in
the wake of the 1996 Act, and addresses the general failure of the resale
carrier model. The second Section of this Article provides an overview of
Section 253 of the 1996 Act, and the various municipal and judicial
interpretations of Section 253 that have created a patchwork of local
regulation governing rights-of-way access throughout the country. The
third Section of this Article provides a series of legislative and
administrative proposals that would serve to create a more unified, pro-
competitive scheme of rights-of-way regulation throughout the United
States.
II. COMPETITIVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER MODELS
Under the framework of the 1996 Act, there are two basic ways a new
entrant into a local telecommunications market can provide service. The
first method is to provide service by "reselling" the services of another
carrier. The second method of providing service is through the
construction of telecommunications facilities for the provision of services.
A. Resale Carriers
Under the 1996 Act, all local telecommunications carriers are
required to resell their services to other local telecommunications cariers.
Under this model, a new carrier can approach a facilities-based carrier and
request that carrier to resell its service at a "discounted" retail rate.7 This
4. See STEWART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND PoLIcY 717-18
(2001) (noting that the 1996 Act provides two statutory alternatives for new entrants into the
local telecommunications market).
5. See id Some commentators suggest that there are three models for entering the
local exchange telecommunications market. See JERRY KANG, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND
PoLIcY 492-93 (2001) (suggesting that local exchange competition could be facilitated
through resale, new construction of facilities, or through a CLEC combining its own
facilities with unbundled network elements ("UNEs") leased from an incumbent carrier).
For the purpose of this Article, the last two categories proposed by Kang will be treated as
"facilities-based" because they both generally require carrier access to public rights-of-way.
6. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1) (Supp. V 2000) (stating that all local exchange carriers
may not prohibit or "impose unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the
resale of its telecommunications services").
7. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of
1996, First Report and Order, I1 F.C.C.R 15499, para. 8, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996)
(stating that the "discount" provided to CLECs is calculated by subtracting "marketing,
billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided or that are avoidable by incumbent
LECs when they provide services wholesale") [hereinafter Local Competition Order]; see
also KANG, supra note 5, at 492 (noting that under this model "a CLEC would buy local
telecommunications service from the ILEC at wholesale prices and then sell them to its
customers at retail prices").
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discount, or wholesale rate, is generally set by state regulators.8 The new
carrier then attempts to make a profit on the provision of this resold service
by reselling it at a rate that is generally equal to or lower than the rates
charged by the incumbent carrier in the market.
After passage of the 1996 Act, a number of CLECs attempted to
provide service using a business model based solely on the provision of
resold service. 9 Many of the new entrants, however, soon realized that it
was impossible to turn a profit due to administrative costs and other
expenses that were higher than the discount spread between the cost of the
wholesale rate and the rate that the new entrants marketed the service to
end users.10
B. Facilities-Based Carriers
Another model for new entrants is the facilities-based carrier model.
Under this model, a new entrant constructs either some or all of the
facilities that are required to operate a telecommunications network." New
entrants that only construct switching facilities on private property and
utilize the incumbent carrier's facilities in the public rights-of-way are often
referred to as "limited" facilities-based carriers, and are often regulated in a
somewhat different manner than "full" facilities-based carriers that actually
construct facilities in the public rights-of-way.
12
In the last two to three years, most new CLECs have embraced the
facilities-based model due to the fact that many entrants relying exclusively
on the resale model found it difficult, and in some cases impossible, to earn
a profit by repackaging and reselling the services of incumbent carriers. 3
8. See Local Competition Order, supra note 7 (explaining that the "Commission
identifies certain avoided costs, and the application of this definition is left to the states").
9. Riley K. Temple, A Look at Three Issues: Network Unbundling, Resale and
Reciprocal Compensation, 18TH ANN. INST. ON TELECOMM. POL'Y. AND REG. 149 (Richard
E. Wilet et al. eds. 2000) (noting that there were sixty-five companies offering resold local
service in New York alone in July 1999).
10. See id (stating that "potential new market entrants have criticized the prevailing
rate discounts as too small to allow successful competition with entrenched incumbents").
11. See BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 718 (noting that the "unbundling provisions" of the
1996 Act "allow a CLEC to purchase access to shared building blocks, whereas the resale
provisions instead allow a CLEC to purchase complete telecommunications services").
12. In general, the courts have held that carriers who install facilities, such as switching
equipment, only on private property and utilize the incumbent's UNEs to complete their
provision of service, do not need to obtain a municipal franchise to "use" the public rights-
of-way. See, e.g., AT&T Comms. of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 52 F. Supp. 2d
756, 760 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that "use of public rights-of-way" is limited to actual
physical occupation of the public rights-of-way by a carrier under Section 253(c)).
13. See D.R. Stewart, Competition Stiffens Among Local Carriers, TULSA WORLD, June
28, 2001, at 3 (noting that CLECs utilizing the pure resale model were much more likely to
fail than carriers that constructed a substantial portion of their networks).
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While the facilities-based model does offer the opportunity for new carriers
to earn a larger profit on their investment, it also presents two regulatory
issues that are unique to facilities-based carriers: interconnection and public
rights-of-way access. Interconnection is the process by which new entrants
"connect" to the networks of incumbent carriers, allowing the new entrants
to provide seamless service between the incumbent carrier's customers and
the new entrant's customers.' 4 Rights-of-way access, on the other hand,
generally involves the process of negotiating agreements with local
governments to install and utilize fiber-optic cable or other transmission
equipment on or below public streets.1
5
Many basic interconnection issues have been resolved through FCC
and state public utility commission rulings concerning the obligations of
incumbents to allow CLECs access to necessary facilities. 6 Unfortunately,
the legal picture in the rights-of-way area is murkier. While Section 253 of
the 1996 Act purports to erase all federal and state impediments to
competition in local telephony, many CLECs have gone through the
process of obtaining the required state and federal approvals necessary to
provide local and interexchange telephone service, only to face the
challenge of obtaining "last mile" rights-of-way access from numerous
municipalities that each require adherence to jurisdiction-specific
regulations and often payment of substantial fees. 17 The next Section of this
14. See Local Competition Order, supra note 7, para. 26, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1
(1996) (concluding that "the term 'interconnection' under section 251(c)(2) refers only to the
physical linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic").
15. See, e.g., Las Vegas, Nev., Franchise Agreement Between City of Las Vegas and
Telecommunications of Nevada, LLC d/b/a NEXTLINK Nevada, at 4 (May 24, 1999)
(defining "rights-of-way" as "all present and future streets, avenues, highways, alleys,
bridges and public ways, (excluding railroad rights-of-way) of the City within the City
limits").
16. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (upholding the vast
majority of the FCC's interconnection rules promulgated in the Local Competition Order).
But see Richard E. Wiley, Communications Law in the Year 2000; The Three "Cs"-
Competition, Convergence, and Consolidation-Continue, 18TH ANN. INST. ON TELECOMM.
PoI'Y. AND REG. 74-76 (2000) (noting that while the Supreme Court upheld many of the
FCC's UNE regulations, certain other interconnection issues are still unresolved).
17. See The Telecom Act Five Years Later: Is it Promoting Competition?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Larissa Herda, President and CEO, Time
Warner Telecom Inc.) [hereinafter Time Warner Telecom Testimony]. "One of the more
unfortunate results of the 1996 Act is that cities and building owners are attempting to
control the pace of competition by extracting unreasonable rates, terms and conditions for
access to a critical pathway to the customer." Id.; Cable & Video: Competitive Choices:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Robert Curry, Vice Chairman,
RCN Corporation).
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Article analyzes Section 253, and provides examples of many of the
municipal challenges that CLECs and other telecommunications providers
face.
I. BARRIERS TO REASONABLE RIGHTS-OF-WAY ACCESS
A. Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
1. Plain Language
In many respects, Section 253 is the cornerstone of the 1996 Act for
local telecommunications competition, as it sets the basic federal standard
prohibiting local and state barriers to entry into the local
telecommunications market. 8 Although Section 253 is comprised of six
subsections, (a) and (c) are particularly relevant to municipal jurisdiction
over public rights-of-way utilized by telecommunications providers.19
Section 253(a) broadly preempts state or local statutes, regulations, or
other legal requirements that "may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting
the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service." ° Accordingly, the FCC has viewed Section
253(a) as a general proscription on state and local laws and regulations that
would interfere with the provision of local telecommunications service.
21
RCN has suggested to the Commission that it establish federally-mandated
standards governing access to such public rights-of-way and require local
authorities to adhere to reasonable standards of timeliness and equitable treatment
in granting such access. The Commission has not yet acted on this proposal. At
the moment there are few clear rules which are uniformly interpreted and applied
in all areas.
Id.
18. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (Supp. V 2000). See also THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AcT OF 1996:
LAW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 10 (Robert E. Emeritz, et al. eds., 1996) ("New Section 253
of the 1934 Act is relatively short but is in many ways the linchpin of the new regulatory
scheme.").
19. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a), (c) (Supp. V 1999). Section 253(b) provides a safe harbor
for state laws and regulations that "preserve and advance universal service, protect the
public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services, and
safeguard the rights of consumers." Id. § 253(b). Section 253(d) provides for FCC
preemption of state or local actions that violate subsection (a) or (b) of Section 253. Id. §
253(d). Section 253(e) provides for separate regulatory treatment of commercial mobile
service providers. Id. § 253(e). Section 253(f) provides certain exceptions from the
requirements of Section 253 for rural markets meeting specific conditions. ld, § 253(0.
20. Id. § 253(a).
21. See Classic Telephone, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 F.C.C.R.
13,082, para. 25, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1062 (1998) [hereinafter Classic Telephone] ("We
conclude that section 253(a), at the very least, proscribes State and local legal requirements
that prohibit all but one entity from providing telecommunications services in a particular
State or locality."); see also Suggested Guidelines for Petitions for Ruling Under Section
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Section 253(c), however, contains an exception that allows state and
local governments to retain control over certain aspects of rights-of-way
management.22 Section 253(c) states that:
Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local
government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and
reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers, on a
competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of the
public rights-of-way on a nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation
.... 23
required is publicly disclosed by such government.
Accordingly, much of the debate over the effect of Section 253 on
municipal rights-of-way management activities has focused on the extent to
which Section 253(c) actually creates an area for municipalities to regulate
use of the public rights-of-way, or whether it merely creates a limited "safe
harbor" for municipalities to regulate carefully defined rights-of-way
• 24
management functions.
2. Legislative History
The legislative history underpinning Section 253 suggests that
Congress intended for local governments to have a limited role in
controlling rights-of-way usage by telecommunications providers. The
1996 Act was cobbled together by a Conference Committee that took
various provisions from separate telecommunications reform bills passed
by both the House of Representatives and the Senate.2 5 In the case of
Section 253, the language ultimately adopted was taken almost exclusively
from the Senate version of the bill.26 Therefore, the Senate history of
Section 253 is critical to determining the legislative intent of that provision.
The Conference Report states that Section 20(a) of the Senate Bill,
which later became Section 253, "is intended to remove all barriers to entry
253 of the Communications Act, Public Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. 22970, 22971 (1998) (noting
that parties filing petitions for preemption under Section 253 "should first describe whether
the challenged requirement falls within the proscription of section 253(a)").
22. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (Supp. V 1999).
23. Id.
24. See Classic Telephone, supra note 21, para. 40 (limiting application of Section
253(c) to municipal "exercise of public rights-of-way management authority or the
imposition of compensation requirements for the use of such rights-of-way"). But see TCG
Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 793 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (arguing that under
Section 253(c), if a municipal regulation is "neither discriminatory nor unreasonable, it
follows that the regulation does not prohibit its entry into the market").
25. See THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1996: LAW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 18, at 5 (noting that two different bills were passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate before being reconciled by a Conference Committee).
26. See S. REP. No. 104-230, at 127 (1996) (noting that the "conference agreement
adopts the Senate provisions" for Section 253).
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in the provision of telecommunications services. 2 1 The Conference Report
then lists the provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of new Section 253 by
repeating the language contained in the plain language of the statute.
Therefore, this language in the Conference Report would appear to support
the premise that the overarching intent of Section 253 is to eliminate
anything that could constitute a barrier to entry in the newly deregulated
telecommunications market. Furthermore, the legislative history appears to
support the contention that subsection (c) of Section 253 merely serves as a
"safe harbor" to protect the ability of municipalities to manage the public
rights-of-way only if such regulation does not prohibit or have the effect of
prohibiting entry into a local market.
Statements by a number of senators who were deeply involved in the
negotiations over Section 253 support this premise as well. During the
Senate floor debate on Section 253(c), Senator Dianne Feinstein gave
examples of the types of rights-of-way management activities that
Congress intended to permit under Section 253(c) in support of an
unsuccessful amendment that would have eliminated the FCC's authority to
preempt certain state or municipal rights-of-way regulations.'s All of the
examples provided by Senator Feinstein dealt with construction and rights-
of-way coordination activities rather than regulations governing the
qualification of telecommunications providers, the provision of service, or
payment of fees based on gross revenues collected within a municipality."
Similarly, Senator Slade Gorton, speaking on behalf of a successful
alternative amendment defining the FCC's authority to preempt barriers to
competition, stated:
[T]he rules that a city or a county imposes on how its street rights of
way are going to be utilized, whether there are above-ground wires or
underground wires, what kind of equipment ought to be used in
excavations, what hours the excavations should take place, are a matter
of primarily local concern and, of course, they are exempted by
27. See id. at 126.
28. See 141 CONG. REc. 15,590-92 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein quoting Letter
from Office of City Attorney, City and County of San Francisco).
29. Senator Feinstein offered the following four examples of her concerns over Sections
253(a) and (d) of the Act:
As city attorneys state, is a city insurance or bonding requirement a barrier to
entry? Is a city requirement that a company pay fees prior to installing any
facilities to cover the costs of reviewing plans and inspecting excavation work a
barrier to entry? Is the city requirement that a company use a particular type of
excavation equipment or a different and specific technique suited to certain local
circumstances to minimize the risk of major public health and safety hazards a
barrier to entry? Is a city requirement that a cable operator move a cable trunk line
away from a public- park or place cables underground rather than overhead in
order to protect public health a barrier to entry?
141 CONG. REc. 15,984 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
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subsection (c) of this section.2 0
Accordingly, based on the legislative history and floor debates, it
appears that much of the floor debate over Section 253(c) revolved around
the municipal right to engage in time, place, and manner rights-of-way
regulations, rather than a broader debate over whether a municipality had
the ability to engage in conduct that could constitute a barrier to entry, in
violation of Section 253(a).
B. Municipal Regulation of Public Rights-of-Way
Based on the plain language and legislative history of Section 253(c)
of the Act, it appears that the provision was intended as a "safe harbor" to
allow municipalities to regulate basic rights-of-way management functions.
Many municipalities, however, have interpreted Section 253(c) quite
differently.3' They view Section 253(c) as granting municipalities new
affirmative rights not only to manage basic rights-of-way functions, but
• 32
also to require payment of substantial fees and in-kind compensation. In
addition, some municipalities also apparently view Section 253(c) as
granting new authority to manage the actual types of services that areS 33
offered by competitive telecommunications providers. As detailed below,
many of these municipal requirements, combined with lengthy and
expensive permit and "franchise" proceedings, often make it nearly
impossible for many new telecommunications providers to enter certain
municipal markets.
30. 141 CONG. REc. 15,984 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton). Senator Gorton also
noted that the Feinstein Amendment would have directed all rights-of-way disputes to
"some 150 or 160 different district courts with different attitudes." Id Senator Gorton noted
that such an approach would lead to "no national uniformity with respect to the very goals
of this bill, what constitutes a serious barrier to entry." I
31. Petition for Declaratory Ruling, City Signal Communications, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland Heights, CS Docket No. 00-253, Comments of Metromedia Fiber Network
Services, Inc. at 8 (filed Jan. 31, 2001) [hereinafter MFN Comments].
Access to public rights-of-way is almost routinely conditioned on MFNS'
provision of monetary or in-kind compensation that clearly violates the [1996] Act
and/or state law. In most cases, the Municipality is clearly prohibited under state
law from requiring compensation for use of the rights-of-way, but the
Municipality makes the argument that the law is no longer valid in light of the
[1996] Act, changing technology, or an absurd interpretation of the law.
Id. (emphasis added).
32. See id
33. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal. Municipal Code § 16.11.070(A)(ii) (2001) (imposing
various service quality requirements on telecommunications providers that do not offer
"service on a common carrier basis"); Petition for Declaratory Ruling, City Signal Comms.,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland Heights, CS Docket No. 00-253, Reply Comments of Metromedia
Fiber Network Servs., Inc. at 9 (filed Feb. 14, 2001) ("Municipalities routinely demand that
carriers agree to provide customer lists for their review.").
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1. Fees and In-Kind Compensation
As noted above, Section 253(c) provides that state and local
governments retain the authority to "manage the public rights-of-way or to
require fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications
providers, on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis. 34 Most
telecommunications providers have read this provision to mean that
providers are liable to municipalities for the actual costs incurred by those
municipalities for their use of the public rights-of-way, a stance that is
generally supported by the plain language and legislative history of Section
253(c). 35 Not surprisingly, many municipalities have taken the opposite
position, arguing that Section 253(c) expressly allows municipalities to
charge a tax or fee, beyond the cost of actual rights-of-way management
36
activities, for use of the public rights-of-way.
Memphis, Tennessee's telecommunications rights-of-way ordinance
37
requires new providers to give the city "as initial compensation" four
optical fibers in any new fiber-optic cable installation, provide the city
with access and spare capacity in all of the new entrant's ducts or pole
attachments in "its overhead or underground system or systems, 39 and
"coordinate design and installation of other network specific requirements
the city may have."40 Furthermore, as general compensation, the city
requires all new telecommunications providers to pay the city five percent
34. 47 U.S.C. § 253(c).
35. See, e.g., Brief of Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. at 39, Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v.
Prince George's County, 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-1784) ("The Act expressly
and narrowly reserves to local governments their existing authority to require fair and
reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral
and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of the public rights-of-way ...."); Press Release,
MediaOne, Rights-of-Way Management Policies (1999) (on file with author) ("MediaOne
accepts that local governments should be compensated for costs incurred as a result of
various entities' access to the right-of-way. Appropriate fees and charges should be set to
cover such costs.").
36. See Nicolas Miller, Telecommunications Planning for Municipalities, Strategic
Resources Inst. Workshop on Telecomm. Planning for Municipalities, § 4, at 2-3 (1999)
Local public streets and rights-of-way are property that a local government holds
on behalf of the public and that is paid for by the taxpayers. All private businesses
that place wires, conduits or pipes over, on or under this public property are
therefore tenants of the public. And like any property owner, the public-through
its local government-is entitled to compensation from those who use its property
for profit and to manage the use of that property to make sure it is used efficiently
and safely.
Id.
37. See MEMPHIS, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, No. 4398 (Dec. 23, 1996).
38. Id. § 10-155(a).
39. Id. § 10-155(b).
40. Id. § 10-155(b)(2).
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of all gross revenues on a quarterly basis.4'
Other municipalities impose compensation requirements that are even
more egregious. Recently, Metromedia Fiber Network Systems, Inc.
("MFN") requested permission from the city of Medina, Washington to lay
42fiber-optic cable beneath a city park. In response, MFN was given a list of
conditions for such access that included payment of $250,000 per year for
use of the park, the free use of eight fiber-optic strands by the city, free
long-distance service for the city and "free high speed internet access to all
Medina citizens., 43 In comments filed with the FCC, MFN reported that
these demands were subsequently reduced by the city, but that the city had
yet to produce a permanent franchise agreement, and that MFN "is
concerned that its decision to bypass the City park property will result in
retribution in the form of franchise delays."44
While many municipalities do not impose compensation requirements
as excessive as those noted above, many other municipalities impose
compensation requirements that exceed the actual municipal cost of
managing the public rights-of-way.5
2. Favorable Treatment of the Incumbent Provider
The favorable municipal treatment of incumbent providers is another
factor that often puts new entrants at a disadvantage. Such discriminatory
treatment often occurs in one of two ways. The first occurs when a
41. Id. § 10-156(1).
The city finds that the public streets, alleys and public rights-of-way to be used by
grantee for the purpose of reselling telecommunications services derived from
telecommunication systems operated within the boundaries of the city are
valuable, public properties, acquired and maintained by the city at great expense
to its taxpayers, and that the grant to grantee of the use of said public streets,
alleys and rights-of-way is a valuable property right, without which the grantee
would be required to invest substantial capital in public right-of-way costs and
acquisitions; the grantee agrees to pay the city as general compensation during
each year of the franchise agreement, an amount equal to five (5) percent of gross
revenues for each quarter of a compensation year.
Id.
42. MFN Comments, supra note 31, at 23 (noting that the city's demands "would be
laughable, were they not so indicative of the manner in which Municipalities view
carriers").
43. Id. at Exhibit F (stating that the demands were "[i]n return for use of city rights-of-
way and, especially, easement through park, which city is not mandated to provide under
State law").
44. Id. at 24.
45. See Elizabeth V. Mooney, Fla. 's Simplified Tax Law Forerunner to Federal Effort,
RCR WmELEss NEws, July 30, 2001, at 10 (stating that "one of the most significant
roadblocks to the expansion of bandwidth capacity in this country is the de facto ransom
that carriers are compelled to pay in exchange for local government approval of requests for
items like rights-of-way and tower siting").
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municipality charges a new entrant a "gross revenue" fee that is not
46
required of the incumbent. Unfortunately, a number of municipalities only
impose compensation requirements on new market entrants, and not on the
incumbent telecommunications provider.
White Plains, New York, for instance, imposes a five percent
franchise fee on new entrants that is not imposed on the incumbent
provider, Verizon Communications. In that case, the city claims that
Verizon is exempted from the fee because it has traditionally provided, and
continues to provide, free city use of its conduit and other facilities
installed in the city's rights-of-way.49 In Lexington, Kentucky, BellSouth
Communications was granted a federal district court injunction prohibiting
the city from enforcing its rights-of-way ordinance, which requires the
payment of five percent of a provider's gross revenues, against BellSouth."
The rationale for the injunction appears to be based on the claim that
BellSouth has a "statewide franchise" to offer telecommunications service
throughout the Commonwealth of Kentucky, along with claims that the
franchise provisions violated Section 253(a) of the Act." The city,
however, continues to enforce the ordinance and its fee provisions against
46. See Brief of Amici Curiae FCC et al. at 14, TCG NY, Inc. v. City of White Plains
(No. 01-7213(L), 01-7255(XAP)) [hereinafter White Plains Brief] (criticizing a municipal
rights-of-way ordinance that requires new entrants to pay a gross-revenue fee while
exempting the incumbent carrier as "precisely the kind of barrier to competitive entry that
Congress intended section 253 to remove").
47. See MFN Comments, supra note 31, at 8-19 (noting numerous instances where
municipalities had placed the incumbent provider in a more favorable condition for real and
in-kind compensation requirements).
48. See TCG NY, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d 81, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
49. See id at 98-99 (holding that Verizon and its predecessor companies have "been
paying a fee to the City, in the form of having provided the City with free use of its
conduit-a valuable asset-in exchange for using the rights-of-way").
50. See Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., No. 00-
41 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 25, 2000) (order granting preliminary injunction). It is important to note
that in Lexington-Fayette County, BellSouth operates as a CLEC, rather than the incumbent
provider GTE (now Verizon). See Answer and Counterclaim of BellSouth Telecomm., Inc.
at 9, Lexington-Fayette County Gov't v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., No. 00-41 (E.D. Ky.
Jan. 31, 2000). BellSouth, however, has a "perpetual statewide franchise" to use rights-of-
way throughout the Commonwealth of Kentucky based on its incumbent status in the
Louisville area, which gives it "incumbent" rights-of-way access statewide. See id. at
Exhibit 6.
51. See BellSouth, No. 00-41, at 1-2 (finding that the Kentucky Public Service
Commission had approved BellSouth's application to operate as a CLEC in the Lexington-
Fayette County area); see also Answer and Counterclaim of BellSouth Telecomm., Inc.,
Lexington-Fayette County Gov't v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., No. 00-41 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 31,
2000) (requesting declaratory and injunctive relief against the Lexington-Fayette County
ordinance based on a statewide "perpetual" franchise to use rights-of-way statewide and
Section 253 of the Act).
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other CLECs operating in the county. 2
The second type of disparate treatment occurs when municipalities
levy in-kind or other "up-front" compensation that is not imposed on
incumbent providers. This type of requirement is often even more harmful
than equitable "gross revenue" requirements, because costs are imposed on
new entrants before they begin to provide service and generate revenue.
MFN notes that Chandler, Arizona charges $1.47 per linear foot for access
to the public rights-of-way in that city.53 In addition, the city also mandates
that MFN install additional conduit and manholes for the city's use, with
compensation to MFN limited to "incremental construction costs."54 MFN
also states that none of these costs are imposed on the incumbent provider,
Qwest Corporation.5
In many cases, such as those detailed above, the imposition of
disparate fees results in dual barriers to new carriers, as they are not only
subject to entry fees and in-kind compensation requirements, but also to
continuing municipal gross-revenue based compensation requirements that
make competing with the incumbent carrier not competitively neutral."
3. "Third-Tier" Regulation of Service Offerings
Municipal regulations that impose operational requirements on
providers seeking access to the public rights-of-way serve as another
barrier to competitive telecommunications providers. These regulations are
often referred to as "third-tier" regulations, because they duplicate the
operational and service standards that are already governed by the FCC or
state regulatory commissions. 7 In addition, these regulations frequently
52. See John Stamper, Laying of Optic Cable Resumes, BellSouth Gets Injunction in
City's Lawsuit Over Fee, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 7, 2000, at C1 ("Other
telecommunications companies, including GTE, e.spire Communications and Insight
Communications, all pay a franchise fee to the city for use of its rights-of-way.").
53. See MFN Comments, supra note 31, at 11 (noting that the city imposes this charge
on MFN because it claims that it is not a "telecommunications provider" because it provides
dark fiber capacity for lease to other carriers).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See White Plains Brief, supra note 46, at 16 (stating that the imposition of a "five
percent gross-revenues franchise fee" on an incumbent provider but not on a new entrant "is
an incremental cost of doing business that inevitably puts [the new entrant] at a pricing
disadvantage [to the incumbent]").
57. See TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
12 F.C.C.R. 21396, para. 105, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 730 (1997) [hereinafter City of Troy]
("Our concern is that some localities appear to be reaching beyond traditional rights-of-way
matters and seeking to impose a redundant 'third-tier' of telecommunications regulation
which aspires to govern the relationships among telecommunications providers, or the rates,
terms and conditions under which telecommunications service is offered to the public.").
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create substantial operational problems for new entrants because they
attempt to require new entrants to provide certain services or follow
operational requirements that can differ from municipality to
municipality."
One example of excessive "third-tier" regulation occurs when
municipalities request detailed information regarding the ownership
structure of a potential rights-of-way user or information regarding the
types of service that a rights-of-way user will provide.59 Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, for instance, requires applicants to respond to no fewer than
• • 60.
five pages of "ownership and control" information, including information
regarding whether the applicant has ever had "alcoholic beverages and
restaurant licenses" revoked,61 or whether an applicant "or any principal
[has] ever provided any consideration to prosecute, support or in any way
further litigation against a municipality, the United States Federal
Communications Commission, or the United States Federal Trade
Commission. ,62 All of this information, however, must also be furnished to
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in connection with any
application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, a
prerequisite to providing interstate telecommunications service to the
63public anywhere in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Another example of unnecessary "third-tier" regulation arises when
municipalities actually attempt to regulate service offerings provided
within municipal boundaries. As noted by MFN in comments to the FCC,
Raleigh, North Carolina's general telecommunications license contains a
list of customer service standards that regulates a wide variety of customer
service issues, including the hours that a telecommunications provider must
be available to take customer complaints, and the time-frame in which new
64customer orders must be filed. All of these customer service standards,
58. See id para. 106 (noting that "a patchwork quilt of differing local regulations may
well discourage regional or national strategies by telecommunications providers").
59. See id. (noting that "where the rates, terms, and conditions under which
telecommunications service is offered to the public are dictated by an [sic] local ordinance,
is of considerable concern to this Commission").
60. BUREAU OF CABLE COMM., DEP'T OF GEN. SERVS., LICENSE APP'N FOR TELECOMMS.
PROVIDERS FOR CITY OF PITrSBURGH, § 1 (2002).
61. Id. § 1.5.
62. Id. § 1.4.
63. See PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N APP'N FOR APPROVAL OF AUTHORITY TO OFFER,
RENDER, FURNISH, OR SUPPLY TELECOMMS. SERVS. TO THE PUB. IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PA., Form PUC-377 (Rev. 10/01) (requiring detailed information about an applicant,
including information detailing the applicant's corporate structure and proposed
telecommunications offerings).
64. See MFN Comments, supra note 31, at Exhibit B (attaching a copy of the city's
"Customer Service Standards").
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however, are already regulated by the North Carolina Utilities
Commission.65 Accordingly, a provider could conform to the state customer
service regulations, and still be fined by one or more municipalities for
failure to adhere to their specific regulations. It is also possible that a
carrier could be fined multiple times, by a state regulator and then by one
or more municipalities, for the same violation.
Even in cases where there is not a direct conflict, municipal service
requirements often subject competitive telecommunications providers to
uncertainty as to how regulatory requirements will be enforced. Jackson,
Mississippi incorporates its Uniform Telecommunications Code66 as a part
of its standard "Nonexclusive Telecommunications Franchise
Agreement." 67 One section of the Uniform Telecommunications Code
attempts to delineate "consumer issues," which include responsibilities
such as "demonstrat[ing] customer responsiveness, truth-in-billing, and [] a
commitment to the local community by maintaining a local customer
service office within the city."68 The ordinance, however, does not
specifically define what would constitute a lack of "responsiveness" and
does not address the question of whether compliance with Mississippi
Public Service Commission regulations governing the provision of
69
telecommunications services would satisfy the ordinance's command .
4. Municipal Delay as a Barrier to Entry
For many new entrants, one of the most harmful and generally
undocumented forms of barrier to entry is municipal delay in approval of
rights-of-way access agreements. 70 For many upstart telecommunications
companies, the ability to quickly serve new customers can often be the
65. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, r.11.R9-8 (Oct. 2001) (detailing the "service objectives"
that "each regulated local exchange telephone company shall perform" in North Carolina,
including "[n]ew service installation appointments not met for Company reasons").
66. JACKSON, MISS., ORDINANCENO. 1996-12(5) (Nov. 28, 1995).
67. JACKSON, Miss., NONExcLusIvE TELECOMM. FRANCHISE AGREEMENT BY AND
BETWEEN THE CrrY OF JACKSON, MISS. AND ENTERGY LOCAL FIBER CO., § 10 (1997).
68. JACKSON, MISS., ORDINANCENO. 1996-12(5) § 35-27 (Nov. 28, 1995).
69. See id. (noting that the "city supports the fairest principles that govern the issues of
privacy and security for consumers of advanced telecommunications service" without
further definition); see also Miss. PuB. SERV. COMM'N R. 38 (1993), available at
http://www.psc.state.ms.us/regs/38.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002) (noting that the
Commission generally requires telecommunications providers to restore "out of order"
telephone service within forty-eight hours).
70. Corrected Comments of Adelphia Business Solutions, Inc., Petition for Declaratory
Ruling, City Signal Comm., Inc. v. City of Cleveland Heights, CS Dkt. No. 00-253, at 9
(filed Jan. 31, 2001), available at http:llgullfoss2.fcc.gov/prodlecfs/ retrieve.cgi?native or_
pdf+pdf&id_.document =6512460412 (last visited Jan. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Adelphia
Comments] (noting that "the economics of facilities-based entry into the
telecommunications marketplace make delay a powerful barrier to competition").
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difference between profitability in a specific market or inability to
compete.7'
Unfortunately, as noted in comments by several competitive providers
to the FCC, a number of municipalities continue to block rights-of-way
access as a means of extracting additional compensation from
72telecommunications providers. MFN, for example, reported that several
cities delayed rights-of-way access negotiations in an attempt to obtain
unreasonable compensation, and refused to issue construction or rights-of-
way use permits until their compensation demands were met.73
Certain municipalities also delay access through the use of "informal"S 74
permit moratoriums. In many of these "moratorium" cases, the
municipality informs a new entrant that it will not allow rights-of-way
access until it enacts a rights-of-way use ordinance governing all carriers.75
All too often, however, the incumbent carrier is allowed to continue to
install facilities in public rights-of-way, even as new entrants are denied76
access. Often, the inability to obtain timely rights-of-way access can be
71. Seeid. at9-10.
One key checkpoint for investors and lenders in the CLEC industry is a CLEC's
speed-to-market. The longer it takes for a CLEC, such as ABS, to begin providing
service in a market, the longer it will be before an investor will see a return, if any,
on its investment and the greater the risk that a lender will not obtain prompt
repayment of its debt financing. To lenders and investors, therefore, delay in a
CLEC's time-to-market is profoundly significant.
Id.
72. See, e.g., MFN Comments, supra note 31, at 4 (noting that MFN "has been
constantly delayed in constructing its network because Municipalities purposely delay or
demand unreasonable compensation in exchange for access to the public rights-of-way");
Adelphia Comments, supra note 70, at 10 (stating that if "a municipality delays ABS for
even a few months, ABS may suffer numerous short and long-term negative effects"); Reply
Comments of the Association for Local Telecomms. Servs., Petition for Declaratory Ruling,
City Signal Comms., Inc. v. City of Cleveland Heights, CS Dkt. No. 00-253, at 6 (filed Feb.
14, 2001) at http:llgullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/ retrieve.cgi?native-or.pdf+pdf&id_
document=6512461715 (last visited Jan. 27, 2002) [hereinafter ALTS Reply Comments]
(concluding that "too many municipalities either have sought to exercise their control for
pecuniary gain, or have been affirmatively uninterested in accommodating new entrants").
73. See MFN Comments, supra note 31, at 20 (stating that Culver City, California "has
had an 'informal' moratorium on issuing telecommunications carrier permits since at least
July 1999").
74. See Adelphia Comments, supra note 70, at 19 (stating that some municipalities
"argue that delay is due to their 'management' of the rights-of-way, and thus is 'saved' from
being an unlawful barrier to entry under Section 253(c)").
75. See ALTS Reply Comments, supra note 72, at 6 (noting that the delays can take
"from six months to a year or more").
76. See Adelphia Comments, supra note 70, at 20 (noting that "[w]hile a municipality is
delaying ABS from constructing and operating, under the guise of 'management' issues, it is
at the same time allowing the ILEC to operate, maintain, and in some instances upgrade its
facilities without delay").
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financially devastating to a competitive provider because it prevents them
from signing up new customers and generating any constant stream of
77
revenue.
C. FCC Interpretation of Section 253
Since passage of the 1996 Act, the FCC has conducted several
proceedings discussing municipal rights-of-way access issues and other
barriers to entry under Section 253. Unfortunately, almost all of the FCC's
cases to date have been extremely timid in their recommendations, and
generally focus on rough concepts of "fair" access to public rights-of-way,
rather than any bright-line rules defining the basic rights-of-way access
. . 78
responsibilities of municipalities.
To date, the FCC's most comprehensive effort to define municipal
rights-of-way access responsibilities under Section 253 came in response to
a Petition for a Declaratory Ruling filed by TCI Cablevision of Oakland
County, Inc. (the "City of Troy" case).79 This case was initiated not by a
new entrant to the local telecommunications market, but by the incumbent
cable television provider, TCI Cablevision ("TCI").80 In early 1994, TCI
77. See ALTS Reply Comments, supra note 72, at 6 (noting that "delay can mortally
wound a CLEC in its attempt to compete with an entrenched, and typically far stronger,
ILEC").
78. This point is perhaps best illustrated by the FCC's latest pronouncement on the
issue. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability
to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps To Accelerate
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third
Report, CC Docket No. 98-146, para. 166-68 (rel. Feb. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Third Report].
In the Third Report, the FCC acknowledged "commenters' concern about the difficulty some
companies have faced in securing access to the rights-of-way necessary to deploy advanced
telecommunications infrastructure in a timely manner." Id. para. 166. However, rather than
proposing any concrete solutions, the FCC merely stated it "asked the Common Carrier
Bureau to further examine this matter to consider the legal and policy issues it presents" and
stated that rights-of-way access issues "may best be served through a forum for all interests
to meet and work together in creating a guiding set of 'best practices' for the appropriate
management of the public's right-of-way." 1d.
79. See City of Troy, supra note 57, para. 1. Prior to City of Troy, the FCC addressed
certain state and municipal laws and regulations containing provisions that new entrants
claimed were barriers to entry and, as such, were prohibited under Section 253. See Classic
Telephone, supra note 21 (preempting two Kansas cities' denial of local franchises to new
local telecommunications provider); Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 3460, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 958 (1997) (preempting a Texas statute
that imposed different "build-out" requirements on different classes of local
telecommunications carriers). Both cases, however, dealt mainly with Section 253(a) barrier
to entry issues, and did not reach significant municipal rights-of-way management issues
implicating Section 253(c).
80. See City of Troy, supra note 57, paras. 11-30 (stating that the city of Troy had
delayed TC's applications for rights-of-way permits to install new fiber optic facilities since
early 1994).
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began a series of projects to upgrade its cable system in the city with fiber-
optic technology, and applied for the necessary city permits to allow the
upgrade project to proceed.8' As the city began to review the permits,
certain city officials apparently became concerned that the new facilities
might be used for the provision of telecommunications services, rather than
just cable service, and began to heavily scrutinize TCI's rights-of-way
82permit applications to upgrade facilities. In December 1995, the city
adopted a telecommunications ordinance that required anyone constructing
facilities capable of providing telecommunications services to get aS 83
"license" from the city for those services. Subsequent to the enactment of
the city's ordinance, the city informed TCI that it would have to obtain a
license under the new telecommunications rights-of-way ordinance before
it would issue any further rights-of-way permits, unless TCI expressly
specified that none of its facilities would be used for telecommunications
services.84 TCI refused and filed its petition with the FCC seeking
preemption of the city's licensing requirements."
Although TCI's petition mainly implicated federal law governing
86
regulation of cable television service, a number of CLECs filed comments
with the FCC in the proceeding requesting that the FCC also determine
whether the ordinance violates Section 253 of the 1996 Act.s7 Not
surprisingly, the FCC refused to expressly state that the ordinance was
preempted by Section 253, and demurred from the opportunity to provide
clear guidelines defining the limits of municipalities to regulate rights-of-
. 88
way use by telecommunications providers. Instead, the FCC provided a
81. See i& para. 11.
82. See id (noting that the city wanted to ensure that TCI would not offer
telecommunications service without first obtaining authority from the city to do so).
83. See icL para. 15 (stating that the Troy ordinance "requires a party to obtain a license
before constructing, maintaining or operating a telecommunications system in the City, and
to obtain a franchise before transacting business by way of a telecommunications system in
the City").
84. See id. para. 20 (noting that the city "continues to insist upon inclusion of its 'not for
telecommunications purposes' condition in the permit").
85. See ia- para. 1 (stating that TCI filed its petition "seeking preemption, a declaratory
ruling and other relief against the City of Troy, Michigan" on July 10, 1996).
86. See iL para. 6 (noting that Petition was primarily based upon Sections 621 and 624
of the Act which limit the power of local franchising authorities to "condition the provision
of telecommunications services by a cable operator").
87. See id paras. 33-35 (detailing comments filed by MCI Metro and MFS urging the
FCC to analyze the city's telecommunications ordinance as a barrier to entry under Section
253). MCI Metro and MFS were subsequently acquired and absorbed into Worldcom, Inc.
88. See id. para. 101 ("Nor do the comments and informal filings seeking preemption of
the Troy Telecommunications Ordinance by MCI, on behalf of MCI Metro, and Worldcom,
on behalf of MFS-D, provide an adequate factual basis as currently in the record for us to
preempt the Troy Telecommunications Ordinance under section 253(d).").
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few pages of dicta that appeared to indicate the FCC's future role in
preempting onerous municipal franchising requirements with "fully
developed factual records."89
In its Section 253 dicta, the FCC suggested that it would take a much
more aggressive role in preempting onerous municipal regulations. First,
the FCC provided a list of rights-of-way management activities that it saw
as consistent with the strictures of Section 253(c).90 Second, the FCC
expressed concern over municipal regulations that go beyond basic rights-
of-way management activities, in noting that some municipalities are
imposing "a redundant 'third tier' of telecommunications regulation which
aspires to govern the relationships among telecommunications providers, or
the rates, terms and conditions under which telecommunications service is
offered to the public."91 In addition, the FCC, apparently seeking to sound a
clear warning to municipalities, stated that "attempts to impose a redundant
'third tier' of regulation at the local level will be met with close scrutiny by
the Commission.,
92
Third, the FCC stated that the "discriminatory application of
telecommunications regulation" between incumbent providers and new
entrants was "[a]n especially troubling issue., 93 This was followed by a
sentence that may be the closest the FCC has ever come to issuing a bright-
line pronouncement on Section 253(c): "Local requirements imposed only
on the operations of new entrants and not on existing operations of
incumbents are quite likely to be neither competitively neutral nor
nondiscriminatory. ,
94
The FCC's pronouncement of these broad objectives may have led
some to believe that the Commission would take a more active role in
ensuring fair and equitable rights-of-way access for new entrants.
Unfortunately, since the City of Troy decision was issued, the FCC has
done very little to further clarify the issue. In fact, the only subsequent case
to involve substantial discussion of state or municipal rights-of-way access
obligations involved a 1999 opinion declining to endorse a contract
between the state of Minnesota and a private company that would grant the
company an exclusive right to install fiber-optic cable alongside interstate
89. Id.
90. See ia& para. 103 (noting that permissible rights-of-way management activities
included "coordination of construction schedules, determination of insurance, bonding and
indemnity requirements, establishment and enforcement of building codes, and keeping
track of the various systems using the rights-of-way to prevent interference between them").
91. Id. para. 105.
92. Id.
93. Id. para. 107.
94. Id. para. 108.
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highways in the state.95 In that case, the FCC stated that "Minnesota fails to
convince us that the existence of alternate rights-of-way means that the
Agreement does not have the potential to prevent certain carriers from
providing facilities-based services. 96 While this case may represent some
expansion of the FCC's view that potential, not just actual barriers to entry
may violate Section 253(a), and not be "saved" by Section 253(c), the
notable lack of any bright-line standards or "rules" for states and
municipalities again makes this case less than helpful in trying to determine
municipal obligations and duties under Section 253.9'
The latest example of the FCC's general failure to take timely action
on Section 253 rights-of-way management issues involves a complaint filed
by City Signal Communications, Inc. against the city of Cleveland Heights,S98
Ohio. The complaint alleged that the city of Cleveland Heights violated
Section 253 by requiring a CLEC to place all of its telecommunications
facilities underground, while allowing the incumbent provider to keep and
continue installing aerial telecommunications facilities on telephone
poles.99 On December 22, 2000, the FCC requested comments from
interested parties on the City Signal Petition.'9 Unfortunately, this case has
now languished at the FCC for over a year, in spite of the fact that the
petition involves municipal discrimination in favor of the incumbent
provider, an issue on which the FCC stated a clear position in the City of
Troy case.01 The FCC's failure to address timely serious rights-of-way
95. See Petition of the State of Minnesota for a Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Effect
of Section 253 on an Agreement to Install Fiber Optic Wholesale Transp. Capacity in State
Freeway Rights-of-Way, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 21697, 18 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1294 (1999).
96. Id. para. 23.
97. In fact, the FCC makes note of the fact that it is again expressly avoiding the
analysis of any substantial Section 253(c) issues in the decision. See id. para. 63 ("Our
discussion of these issues should not be interpreted as addressing potential issues involving
the Commission's jurisdiction under section 253(c).").
98. See City Signal Comm., Inc. v. City of Cleveland Heights, Petition for Declaratory
Ruling, CS 00-253 (filed Oct. 18, 2000).
99. See id. at 2 (noting that the "City of Cleveland Heights has refused to grant City
Signal Communications authorization to use the public right of way to string aerial fiber
optic cable for telecommunications purposes on existing utility poles").
100. See Comments Sought on City Signal Communications, Inc. Petition for
Declaratory Ruling Concerning Use of Public Rights of Way for Access to Poles in
Cleveland Heights, Ohio Pursuant to Section 253, Public Notice, CS 00-253, DA-00-2870
(rel. Dec. 22, 2000). Many of the examples of municipal discrimination against new entrants
detailed in Section I were taken from comments filed in this proceeding and which the
FCC should be acutely aware of. See, e.g., MFN Comments, supra note 31; Adelphia
Comments, supra note 70; ALTS Reply Comments, supra note 72.
101. See City of Troy, supra note 57, para. 101 (noting that the FCC stated that
provisions aimed solely at new entrants were quite likely to be in violation of Section
253(a)).
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access issues, such as the City Signal case, represents not only a regulatory
failure, but also a threat to many CLECs that increasingly find that they
have nowhere to turn for expedient resolution of rights-of-way issues.
D. Judicial Interpretation of Section 253
As a result of the FCC's failure to address substantial rights-of-way
issues, a number of new entrants have turned to the courts to seek
clarification of municipal rights-of-way issues. Many of the cases filed at
the federal district court level by CLECs and other new entrants have been
successful in striking down a number of municipal efforts to impose fees
that are not reasonable and cost-based, and operational requirements that
are noncompetitively neutral or pose a barrier to entry. 2 Recently,
however, a split in the interpretation of Section 253 has developed between
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, which again threatens to undermine any uniform application
of Section 253.
1. The Ninth Circuit Interpretation of Section 253
In City of Auburn v. Qwest,'03 the Ninth Circuit addressed the question
of whether Section 253 of the Act preempted municipal ordinances in
various Washington municipalities that imposed certain franchise
requirements on telecommunications providers installing facilities within
those jurisdictions. '°4 As part of the franchise requirements in the cities,
telecommunications providers were required to provide "lengthy and
102. See, e.g., AT&T Comm. of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582
(N.D. Tex. 1999) (enjoining enforcement of a Dallas ordinance that sought to impose fees
and operational requirements on telecommunications providers that were unrelated to rights-
of-way management); BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. City of Coral Springs, 42 F. Supp. 2d
1304, 1308-09 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (striking down portions of Coral Springs rights-of-way
management ordinance that do not deal directly with managing the rights-of-way); PECO
Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, 1999 WL 1240941 at *8 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (voiding a
local rights-of-way management ordinance and finding that the 1996 Act preserves very
specific authority to local governments). But see TCG New York, Inc. v. City of White
Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d 81, 95-100 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding a city ordinance that
required a CLEC to pay a five percent fee for use of the public rights-of-way while
exempting the incumbent provider from payment of such fee).
103. 260F.3d 1160(9th Cir. 2001).
104. Id. at 1166. The case was originally filed in Washington state court against Qwest
by the cities of Auburn, Bellingham, Bremerton, Des Moines, Federal Way, Fife,
Lakewood, Medina, Olympia, Puyallup, Renton, SeaTac, Shoreline, Spokane, Tacoma,
Tukwila, University Place, and Vancouver. Qwest removed the case to federal district court,
and filed a counterclaim against the cities of Auburn, Des Moines, Olympia, Tacoma, and
University Place-"the counterclaim cities"-alleging violations of Section 253 of the Act.
The district court dismissed Qwest's counterclaim, and Qwest appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
See id.
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detailed application form[s]" for the municipality to review the provider's
qualifications to provide service, 10 5 submit to ordinance provisions
regulating the ownership and transfers of the provider, 0 6 and adhere to
provisions regulating the price of services offered within the community.' 7
In addition, the ordinances also imposed direct' °8 and in-kind compensation
requirements that were not directly tied to municipal rights-of-way
management costs.109
In a strong opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that the challenged
provisions of the municipal ordinances violated Section 253(a) because
they sought to "establish franchise systems that regulate the
telecommunications companies themselves, not merely the rights-of-
way."" 0 In addition, the court harshly criticized municipal efforts to base
regulation of a provider's "fitness to provide services" on the possible effect
it might have on rights-of-way usage, stating that such an approach would
allow the "safe harbor" in Section 253(c) to "swallow whole" Section
253(a)'s broad prohibition of barriers to entry."'
2. The Sixth Circuit Interpretation of Section 253
In stark contrast to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the Sixth Circuit gave
a very broad reading to the municipal powers allowed under Section 253,
and upheld a municipal ordinance that required many of the same rights-of-
way franchising requirements as the municipal ordinances implicated in the
Qwest case. In TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn,"2 the court upheld a lower
court decision that a Dearborn, Michigan ordinance imposing a four
percent gross receipts and further in-kind compensation requirement as a
precondition for use of municipal rights-of-way was permissible pursuant
to Section 253."' Unfortunately, the court provided little discussion or
105. Id. at 1178. The court noted that the applications included:
[D]ata gathered by the cities in order to determine the financial soundness,
technical qualifications, and legal ability to provide telecommunications services;
a description of all services provided currently or in the future; and unnamed
discretionary factors that may have nothing to do with the management or use of
the rights-of-way.
Id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1178-79.
108. See id. at 1179, n.19 (noting that the cities of Auburn, Des Moines, and Olympia set
non-cost-based fees).
109. See id. at 1170 (stating that the counterclaim cities required providers to provide
excess conduit capacity as a term of any franchise).
110. Id.at 1178.
111. Id. at 1179-80.
112. 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
113. Id. at 621 (noting that the Dearborn ordinance and TCG's proposed franchise with
[Vol. 54
LOCAL RIGHTS-OF-WAYACCESS
analysis of why the fee was permissible under Section 253. In addressing
whether the fee presented a barrier to entry under Section 253(a), as
claimed by TCG, the court merely stated that "the [district] court found the
fee in question to be both fair and reasonable," and that "the [district]
court's examination of this question was thorough and its reasoning
sound."' 15
This decision was even further complicated by the fact that the lower
court specifically exempted the incumbent provider, Ameritech, from
paying the fee due to its preexisting "state-wide franchise."" 6 This disparate
treatment among providers, due to the state-wide franchise or any other
reason, would appear to implicate the nondiscrimination provisions of
Section 253(c), as the differing fee structures would inevitably make it
harder for TCG to compete."17 In addressing this point, the Sixth Circuit
held that since the city tried to assess the fee against Ameritech, this
evidenced the city's intention not to discriminate, and therefore made the
city's action allowable under Section 253(c)." 8
Other provisions of the ordinance, which imposed a number of third-
tier regulations, such as requiring municipal approval of service offerings
and requiring prior approval of transfers and assignments of a provider or
the city required the payment by TCG of four percent of its gross revenues, on top of a
$50,000 one-time fee and up to $2,500 in reimbursement of the city's administrative costs).
Although the Sixth Circuit decision does not mention it, the $50,000 one-time payment was
apparently in lieu of an in-kind compensation requirement in the ordinance that required
providers to give the city a certain number of strands in their fiber-optic cables. See TCG
Detroit, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 787 (noting that the payment was in lieu of providing the city with
four fiber-optic strands).
114. See Paul Glist, et al., Telecommunications Franchising, 642 PLIPAT 349, 373
(2001) (on appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, but provided no
meaningful discussion of the franchise fee analysis under Section 253, or of any other case
addressing Section 253).
115. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000).
116. See TCG Detroit, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 796-97 (holding that Ameritech was granted
state-wide franchise to operate and that Dearborn could not require Ameritech to enter into a
franchise agreement).
117. See it at 791 (noting TCG's claim that the city is not demanding compensation on a
competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis).
118. See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 625. The Sixth Circuit noted that because Ameritech
enjoys a state-wide rights-of-way franchise its competitive position is strengthened, and it
might be able, in theory, to undercut its competition. See id. After acknowledging this
disparity, however, the court refused to address it by asserting that this was not TCG's
overall allegation (TCG has not alleged that this has occurred). See id. This analysis, at the
very least, represents an improvement from the district court rationale, which held that the
city did not have to impose exactly the same requirements and that it is enough that the city
imposes (or plans to impose) comparable burdens. See TCG Detroit, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
The district court, however, never details how the imposition of a four percent gross
revenues charge on one provider and no charge on the incumbent provider is a comparable
burden.
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its assets, were never even addressed by the district court or the Sixth
Circuit."9 Though the Sixth Circuit's decision contains little analysis of
Section 253 and its overall intent, the Sixth Circuit's holding is squarely at
odds with the general holding of the Ninth Circuit in City of Auburn v.
Qwest.
This circuit split, and the absence of any concrete and enforceable
Section 253 decisions by the FCC, has led to further uncertainty in the
competitive telecommunications market, and is at least partially responsible
for the lack of capital investment in the CLEC market. 20 In light of the
confusion caused by the circuit split and the regulatory vacuum created by
the FCC, the time has come for Congress to reexamine and amend Section
253 to clarify municipal rights-of-way access responsibilities required to
create a vibrant market for competitive, facilities-based carriers in the
United States.
IV. STATE RESPONSES TO MUNICIPAL RIGHTS-OF-WAY
ACCESS ISSUES
Due to the failure of the FCC and the courts to clarify the issue of
municipal rights-of-way access, a number of states have taken action to
rein in municipal demands and foster the further development of facilities-
based competition in the local telecommunications market. As detailed
below, many of these state initiatives focus on the same issues identified by
the FCC in its rights-of-way management orders. Unlike the FCC orders,
however, many of the state statutes lay out clearly defined guidelines and
rules for municipalities in order to limit fees and other barriers to entry that
often confront new entrants into the local telecommunications market.
A. Direct Fees
At least ten states have enacted statutes that generally limit rights-of-
way management fees to the direct costs incurred by municipalities by a
telecommunications provider's physical use of the public rights-of-way.1
119. See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, No. 98-803937-CK (Wayne Cty., Mich. Cir.
Ct. 1999).
120. See Time Warner Telecom Testimony, supra note 17, at *7 (noting the enormous
capital investment required to construct facilities-based local networks and stating that
Congress should consider amending the Act to give the FCC the ability to ensure fair and
consistent public policy by establishing nondiscriminatory access on a competitively neutral
basis).
121. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-582B (West Supp. 2001) (application fees,
permit fees and charges must be directly related to the costs incurred by the political
subdivision in providing services relating to the granting or administration of application
and permits); IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-101(4)(b) (West 2001) (costs must be limited to the
direct, actual, and reasonably incurred costs a municipality incurs in managing the public
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For example, Washington's fights-of-way access statute states that a
municipal fights-of-way may recover "actual administrative expenses
incurred by a city or town that are directly related to receiving and
approving a permit, license, and franchise, to inspecting plans and
construction, or to the preparation of a detailed statement. 122 Other states,
such as Florida'23 and South Carolina, have set fixed rights-of-way use
fees that are at least roughly calibrated to compensate municipalities for
direct management costs.
At a very minimum, these statutes define what costs may be factored
into the fights-of-way management fee imposed by municipalities in those
states. This, in turn, fosters competition by providing new entrants with at
least some guarantee that they will be free of excessive municipal
compensation demands in those jurisdictions.
B. In-Kind Compensation
At least five states have also taken action to prohibit municipalS 125
imposition of in-kind compensation requirements. Other states, such as
right-of-way); IOWA CODE ANN. § 480A.3 (West 1999) (local governments may only
recover management costs that are caused by the public utility's activity in the public right-
of-way); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 237.162(9) (West Supp. 2002) (local government may incur
management costs incurred as a result of actions or inactions of that user); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:30A-124(a) (West Supp. 2001) (telecommunications providers are not subject to any
fees, taxes, levies or assessments in the nature of a local franchise, right-of-way, or gross
receipts fee, tax, levy or assessment); N.D. CErN. CODE § 49-21-26 (1999) (a municipality
may only recover a fee for its management costs); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4939.03(B)
(Anderson 2000) (construction permit fee limited to direct incremental costs incurred by the
political subdivision in inspecting and reviewing any plans and specifications and in
granting the associated permit); WASH. REv. CODE § 35.21.860(1)(b) (2000) (limiting fees
to actual administrative expenses).
122. WASH. REv. CODE § 35.21.860(1)(b) (2000).
123. Until October 1, 2001, Florida allowed municipalities and counties to charge a fee
of up to one percent of gross receipts for use of the public rights-of-way. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 337.401(3) (West 1991) (noting that such fee may only be levied on recurring local
service revenues for services provided within the corporate limits of the municipality by a
telecommunications provider). Effective October 1, 2001, Florida combined the rights-of-
way fee and other state excise taxes into a local communications services tax, which is
collected by the state and partially remitted to municipalities and counties. See 2001 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2001-140 (West). Under this scheme, municipalities and counties that
refrain from imposing additional rights-of-way permit fees can impose an additional 0.12 to
0.24 gross revenue levy on local telecommunications providers. See id
124. South Carolina law allows a municipality to impose a business license tax of 0.3 of
one percent on retail telecommunications services, along with a rights-of-way franchise or
consent fee not to exceed $1,000. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 58-9-2220(1), 58-9-2230(A)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000). After the year 2003, a municipality, under certain circumstances,
may increase the business license tax fee to 0.75 of one percent. See id. at 58-9-2220(2)(a).
125. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 480A.4 (West 1999) (stating that local governments
shall not require in-kind services by a public utility right-of-way user, or require in-kind
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Arizona, continue to allow some use of negotiated in-kind compensation
requirements, but require that the value of the in-kind compensation be
subtracted from the overall fees imposed by a municipality in order to
•• 126
maintain neutrality among providers.
C. Third-Tier Regulations
In order to prevent burdensome rights-of-way applications that
request compliance with, or information on, regulatory requirements
already imposed by the FCC or state regulatory commissions, some states
have taken action to prevent the imposition of these "third-tier"
requirements by municipalities. For example, South Carolina law prohibits
municipalities from using their authority over rights-of-way to regulate any
functions also regulated by the FCC or the South Carolina Public Service
Commission. 127 Minnesota, on the other hand, specifically enumerates the
information that municipalities may collect, and specifically excludes
operational requirements from the list of permissible municipal information
requests.128
D. Prevention of Municipal Delay
As discussed earlier, municipal delay often constitutes the most
serious rights-of-way entry barrier because it completely locks a new
entrant out of a potential market. While the FCC has made a number of
amorphous statements regarding municipal delay, some states have taken
action to impose a concrete timetable on municipal rights-of-way access
negotiations. Ohio, for instance, requires that municipalities approve rights-
of-way use applications "within thirty days after the date a utility service
provider or cable operator applies for consent for the use of a public
services as a condition of the use of the local government's public right-of-way); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 237.163(7)(d) (West Supp. 2002) (prohibiting the provision of in-kind
services by a telecommunications rights-of-way user); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-21-27 (1999)
(political subdivision may not require in-kind services by a telecommunications company as
a condition of using the public rights-of-way); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4939.03(A)
(Anderson 2000) (prohibiting municipalities from requiring any nonmonetary or free service
for use of the public rights-of-way).
126. See Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-582D (West Supp. 2001) (stating that any municipal
"license or franchise shall be structured so that the in-kind payments made.., under the
license or franchise .... are less than or equal to and are offset against any transaction
privilege license tax on the business of providing telecommunications services").
127. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2240 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000) (noting that matters
relating to the operations, systems, service quality, service territory, and prices of a
telecommunications company are explicitly excluded from municipal regulation).
128. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 237.163(2)(b) (West Supp. 2002) (allowing municipalities
to require telecommunications providers to submit a registration statement with information
directly related to municipal management of the public rights-of-way).
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way."' 29 Similarly, Michigan requires municipalities to take action on
telecommunications providers' rights-of-way access requests within ninety
days of the receipt of an application for such access.130
V. PROPOSALS
A. Congress Should Amend Section 253 to Create a National
Rights-of-Way Access Standard
In light of the FCC's failure to adequately address rights-of-way
access issues and the conflicting opinions from the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits, the best option for clearly defining municipal rights-of-way access
obligations is congressional action to amend Section 253. As detailed
above, a number of states have already enacted municipal rights-of-way
management statutes that seek to fill the void left by FCC inaction on this
issue. While this state action has made market entry easier for new entrants
in those states, it has done nothing to further the 1996 Act's mandate of a
"pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework" designed to
increase telecommunications options."' Accordingly, it is time for
Congress to enact a three-prong amendment to the existing Section 253 that
will ease rights-of-way access burdens for competitive telecommunications
providers.
First, Congress should amend Section 253 to state that municipal
requirements for use of the public rights-of-way must be limited to matters
that directly impact the public rights-of-way. The requirements may not
include "third-tier" requests or requirements, including requests for
financial, managerial, or operational information from the provider. This
129. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4939.02(F) (Anderson 2000).
130. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 484.2251(3) (West Supp. 2001) (stating that a local
unit of government shall approve or deny access under this section within 90 days from the
date a provider files an application for a permit to access to a right-of-way, easement, or
public place).
131. S. CoNF. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996).
132. As stated previously, the FCC has already expressed serious concern over multiple,
inconsistent obligations imposed on a community-by-community basis. City of Troy, supra
note 57, para. 106. Congress should build upon the FCC's observation by amending Section
253 to prohibit municipal regulation that is not directly related to use of the rights-of-way.
Such a prohibition, however, could contain a specific list of rights-of-way management
activities that would fall within a municipal safe harbor. Minnesota, for example, provides
that local governments may request: (1) a rights-of-way "applicant's name ... address, and
telephone and facsimile numbers"; (2) evidence that the provider has registered with the
state underground utility locator service; (3) "the name, address, and telephone and
facsimile numbers of the applicant's local representative"; (4) "proof of adequate insurance";
(5) "other information deemed reasonably necessary by the local government unit for the
efficient administration of the public right-of-way"; (6) "to submit ... plans for construction
and major maintenance that provide reasonable notice to the local government unit of
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limitation would give telecommunications providers certainty as to their
local regulatory requirements, while still allowing municipalities to retain
their traditional rights-of-way management functions.
Second, Congress should amend Section 253 to state that the only
costs municipalities may recover for rights-of-way access are those directly
attributable to that provider's use of the public rights-of-way.'33 Such costs
should be limited to costs incurred through the review of rights-of-way
applications and issuance of permits, review of facilities plans, inspection
of installation and repair work conducted in the public rights-of-way, and
any costs incurred by the failure of a provider to restore any affected
portion of the public rights-of-way to its original state.14 Revised Section
253 should also state that in-kind contributions shall be neither required nor
allowed by providers.
35
Finally, Congress should amend Section 253 to include a provision
that allows for acceleration of a rights-of-way access request. Acceleration
should occur if a municipality either denies or fails to act in good faith on a
telecommunications provider's rights-of-way access request within seventy-
136five days of receiving a complete rights-of-way access application. This
projects"; and (7) an applicant to "obtain a right-of-way permit"; (8) the imposition of
"permit conditions consistent with the local government unit's management of the right-of-
way." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 237.163.2(b)(l)-(3) (West 2000).
133. The Indiana statute governing utility rights-of-way access provides a useful
definition of such direct costs:
(1) Registering occupants.
(2) Verifying public right-of-way occupation.
(3) Inspecting job sites and restoration projects.
(4) Restoring work inadequately performed after providing notice and the
opportunity to correct the work.
(5) Administering a reasonable restoration ordinance that ensures that a
public utility or department of public utilities adequately restores the
right-of-way as near as is reasonably possible to the right-of-way's
original condition.
(6) Management costs associated with the implementation of an ordinance
adopted under this section.
However, as used in this section, direct, actual, and reasonably incurred
management costs do not include rents, franchise fees, or any other
payment by a public utility or department of public utilities for
occupation of the public right-of-way.
IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-101(b) (West 2000).
134. See id
135. See, e.g., id. (prohibiting any other payment for use of the rights-of-way); see also
TCG Detroit, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (noting that at least four states have explicitly outlawed
local government demands for in-kind compensation).
136. The FCC has already established this type of expedited review for pole attachment
disputes between telecommunications providers seeking to use another utility's telephone
poles. See Local Competition Order, supra note 7, para. 1224 (stating that the Commission
[Vol. 54
LOCAL RIGHTS-OF-WAYACCESS
acceleration could be in the form of an arbitration conducted by a state
utility commission. Alternately, in cases where a state utility commission
declines to intervene, the arbitration could be conducted by the FCC's
Enforcement Bureau.
3 7
Enactment of this three-pronged amendment to Section 253 would
signify that Congress is serious about creating a truly competitive
telecommunications market by creating uniform ground rules that would
allow any new entrant to compete on equal terms. 38 This, in turn, would
sought to establish swift and specific enforcement procedures that will allow for competition
where access can be provided). Under this expedited review process, a telecommunications
provider must request use of another utility's poles in writing. If the utility then fails to allow
access, it is required to notify the telecommunications provider, in writing, of the denial
within 45 days. The telecommunications provider is then allowed to file an expedited
complaint with the FCC. See id; see also 47 C.F.R. §1.1403(b) (2001) (noting that the
utility's denial letter "shall be specific, shall include all relevant evidence and information
supporting its denial, and shall explain how such evidence and information relate to a denial
of access for reasons of lack of capacity, safety, reliability or engineering standards"). The
provider may then file an expedited complaint with the Commission. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.1404;
see also Local Competition Order, supra note 7, para. 1225 (stating that final decisions
relating to access will be resolved by the Commission expeditiously). The seventy-five day
period proposed herein would grant municipalities an extra thirty days over the period
allowed for pole attachment denials. Under this approach, municipalities would have a
reasonable amount of time to review rights-of-way applications, but would not be able to
unreasonably delay access to new telecommunications providers.
137. Such arbitration is already prescribed by the 1996 Act and widely used in cases
where carriers fail to agree on terms for interconnection agreements. See 47 U.S.C.
§252(b)(1) (stating that a carrier or any other party to the negotiation may petition a state
commission to arbitrate any open issues resulting from an interconnection request "[d]uring
the period from the 135th to the 160th day (inclusive) after the date on which an incumbent
local exchange carrier receives a request for negotiation); see also 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5)
(mandating that the FCC assume the responsibility of the state commission under this
section with respect to the proceeding or matter and act for the state conunission if such
commission does not assume responsibility for interconnection arbitrations or approvals).
Cases that state commissions refuse to arbitrate or review could be referred to the FCC,
which could then ostensibly refer them to the Enforcement Bureau. In addition, the
amendment to Section 253 should also state that cases referred to state commissions or the
FCC should be resolved in a timely fashion, such as ninety days.
138. To adopt the three-pronged solution advocated in this Article, revised Section
253(c) should read as follows:
(c) STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY State and local
governments may manage the use of public rights-of-way by telecommunications
providers, provided that:
(1) Compensation for use of the public rights-of-way must be limited to the
direct, actual cost a state or local government incurs in managing the public
rights-of-way. These costs may include:
(A) registering rights-of-way occupants pursuant to a registration or
application process;
(B) verifying public rights-of-way occupation;
(C) inspecting job sites and restoration projects;
(D) restoring work inadequately performed after providing notice and
opportunity to correct the work; and
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likely spur more stable investment and development in the facilities-based
telecommunications market. 13 9 Most importantly, this change would likely
spur development of competition in the small business and residential
market, which have been largely shielded from competition thus far due to
the enormous cost of rights-of-way access.140
B. The FCC Should Create a Rights-of-Way Access "Rocket
Docket"
As detailed above, the best response to municipal rights-of-way
access barriers would come in the form of a wholesale revision of the
rights-of-way access provisions of Section 253.4 In the absence of
congressional action, however, the FCC can at least take steps to minimize
municipal delay by administratively creating a fast-track "rocket docket" in
the FCC's Enforcement Bureau. This regulation could be modeled on the
statutory solution suggested above that could resolve rights-of-way access
disputes between providers and municipalities.142 The "rocket docket" could
(E) administering a reasonable restoration ordinance that ensures that a
telecommunications provider adequately restores the affected rights-of-
way to its original condition.
(2) applications or registrations by telecommunications providers shall only
request information related to the direct physical occupation of the rights-of-
way, such as the current name, address, and telephone number of a company
contact, maps or other information indicating the current location of
facilities, current evidence of insurance and bonding, and current evidence
that a provider has registered with an underground utility locator service.
(3) state or local governments shall approve or deny application for use of the
public rights-of-way by telecommunications providers within seventy-five
days of receipt of a written request, along with any additional information
required pursuant to subsection (b). In the case of a denial, the
telecommunications provider may appeal to the Commission, which shall
issue an order preempting the municipality within sixty days of the receipt of
a complete Petition for Preemption if it finds a violation of subsection (a) or
(b). Upon written notification to the Commission, a state commission may
assume the above responsibilities, provided that the state commission resolve
such disputes within sixty days of the receipt of a complete Petition
requesting preemption of a state or local law, regulation, or ordinance.
139. See ALTS Analysis, supra note 2, at 12 (stating that in order "to further bolster
investor confidence, Congress must act to correct the market place failures that are standing
in the way of full, effective competition and preventing the full intent of the Act from being
realized").
140. See id.
141. See supra Section V.A. (detailing possible revisions to Section 253 of the 1996
Act).
142. A number of CLECs have suggested the creation of such a review process within
the FCC's Enforcement Bureau. See, e.g., ALTS Reply Comments, supra note 72, at 27-29
(urging the FCC to adopt an expedited review process for violations of Section 253); MFN
Comments, supra note 31, at 32 (stating that the FCC should clarify that the Enforcement
Bureau has jurisdiction over Section 253 issues and make the escalated dispute resolution
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take cases where a municipality and telecommunications provider have
negotiated in good faith for at least seventy-five days, but failed to reach an
agreement on terms. 43 Once submitted, complaints would be reviewed and
resolved in a period not to exceed ninety days' 44
The creation of such a "rocket docket" at the FCC has been urged by a
number of competitive carriers over the last year.145 Its creation, at least in
the interim, would give facilities-based telecommunications carriers an
option other than expensive and time-consuming litigation for pursuing
disputes. 46
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1996 Act held out the promise of a deregulated, competitive
telecommunications market that offered business and residential customers
a wide variety of telecommunications services at lower prices than those
offered by monopoly telecommunications providers. Unfortunately, six
years after the passage of the 1996 Act, that promise has not been fulfilled,
mainly because competitors cannot gain the rights-of-way access necessary
to construct next-generation telecommunications networks. In order to
finally unleash the promise of the 1996 Act, Congress must act to amend
Section 253 to set a national rights-of-way access standard that will allow
new market entrants fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory access to the
public rights-of-way throughout the United States.
process, "rocket docket", available for these matters as well as informal mediation by the
Enforcement Bureau staff); see also Steve Rosenbush & Peter Elstrom, 8 Lessons from the
Telecom Mess, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 13, 2001, at 66 (urging the creation of a more effective
arbitration process at the FCC for disputes).
143. This provision roughly mirrors the provision advocated for a statutorily created
"rocket docket". S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996).
144. Ia (noting the FCC's expedited review procedures for pole attachment disputes);
see also 47 C.F.R. §1.730(a) (2000) (detailing an accelerated docket for complaints lodged
by a carrier against another carrier).
145. See, e.g., ALTS Reply Comments, supra note 72 (noting that several CLECs have
urged the creation of a rocket docket to resolve rights-of-way disputes).
146. Although Section V.A. of this Article advocates that Congress expressly mandate
that the FCC create an expedited resolutions procedure for rights-of-way disputes, the FCC
already has the broad power to create such a mechanism on its own motion pursuant to
Section 253(d) of the 1996 Act. See 47 U.S.C. §253(d) (stating that if the FCC determines
that a state or local government has imposed any barrier to entry the Commission shall
preempt the enforcement of such statute, regulation, or legal requirement to the extent
necessary to correct such violation or inconsistency). Congressional action imposing a firm
deadline for FCC action in such cases, however, would likely make the process much more
effective.
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